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March 29, 2008
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The Iran-Contra affair is not one scandalous incident, but rather two covert
operations started under Reagan's administration. In the beginning, these two
operations were independent of each other, but eventually became linked
though funds received from the sale of arms to Iran for hostages and then
given to the Contras fighting to overthrow a Marxist government in
Nicaragua. The scandal began with Nicaraguan politics. After the Marxist
Sandinista regime took over Nicaragua in 1979, the government was faced
with a growing communist threat to US interest in Central America. When
President Reagan took office in 1981, he was vehemently determined to halt
the spread of communism, especially in Central America (Arnson 1989, 8).
Seeking to bolster US prestige and military power, Reagan took a tough
stand against communism in the Western Hemisphere. In Nicaragua, he gave
the Central Intelligence Agency the approval to help organize and aid a group
of Contrarevolucionarios or Contras who were in opposition to the
Sandinista regime (Arnson 1989, 6). Congress, unwilling to fight in another
country's war after the devastating loss in Vietnam, began restricting the use
of government funds for rebel guerrillas in Central America. The CIA,
concerned that soon Congress would cut off the funding for their program,
began to stockpile arms for the contras (Walsh 1997, 18). Their fears were
realized when Congress enacted the second Boland Amendment which
stated: No funds available tot he Central Intelligence Agency, the Department
of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in
intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose of which
would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization,
movement, or individual (Arnson 1989, 167-8). The Reagan administration
interpreted the Boland Amendment as not covering the activities of the
National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was established in 1947 with
the explicit purpose of advising the President on all matters relating to national
security. Beginning with the Eisenhower administration, the NSC was given a
small staff that ultimately grew and turned into a vital arm of the presidency.
As years went by, the NSC staff began controlling the policy-making output
of both State and Defense Department, as well as the activities of the CIA
(Draper 1991, 11). When the CIA was banned from acting in Nicaragua by
the second Boland amendment, President Reagan surreptitiously bypassed
Congress and employed his NSC staff instead. National Security Council
staffer Oliver North became the central coordinator supplying aid to the
Contras. After Reagan's reelection in 1984, he began an additional covert
operation. This time, it was the effort to release seven American hostages
being held in Lebanon by a radical Islamic group called the Hezbollah. The
operation included trading arms for hostages, which clearly violated the Arms
Export Control Act, the National Security Act, and stated US policy not to
deal with terrorists (Walsh 1997, 3). Iran, in the middle of a war with Iraq,
was desperate for weapons. Many Iranians approached US officials offering
t help free the hostages in Lebanon in exchange for arms. National Security
Adviser Robert McFarlane was approached by Israeli intermediaries and
was persuaded to ask the President about negations with the Iranians.
Reagan approved a shipment of 96 wire-guided anti-tank missiles to be
delivered to Iran on August 30, 1985, and another 408 to be delivered on
September 14. After the secret exchange of these weapons, the Iranians
released only one hostage. In an effort to release more hostages, a second
large shipment of weapons was to take place in November. The Israeli
aircraft intended to ship the weapons could not fly directly to Iran. The plan
was to fly to a European air base, transfer the cargo to another plane and
then fly to Iran, but they were not able to obtain the necessary clearance to
do so. From that point on, Oliver North began arranging for CIA planes to
carry the shipment of weapons to Iran (Walsh 1997, 5). The President then
decided to drop the Israelis as middlemen and negotiated the direct sale of
arms from the United Stated to Iran. HE also decided to keep these actions
secret from Congress. North subsequently began selling the Iranians missiles
at marked up prices. He negotiated low purchase price with the Department
of Defense and the surplus funds were then used to pay for aid to the Contras
(Walsh 1997, 20). Two unrelated incidents that revealed Iranian and Contra
covert operations occurred within one month of each other. On October 5,
1986, Sandinista troops shot down an airplane carrying ten thousand pounds
of ammunition and weapons being sent to the Contras who were fighting in
northern Nicaragua. The only surviving crewmember, Eugene Hassenfus, was
captured and confessed his role in an American covert operation to aid the
Contras. He was also found crying the business card of a US official who
was integral to the arms deal (Arnson 1989, 199). The second incident
occurred on November 3, 1986. A Lebanese magazine, Al Shiraa, published
a story that exposed the United States sale of arms to Iran in exchange for
hostages. This story was picked up by the news media not only in the United
States but also throughout the world, as was confirmed by the speaker of the
Iranian parliament (Walsh 1997, 8). The connection to these two events was
confirmed domestically when Edwin Meese, Counselor to the President and
Attorney General, announced that money from the sale of weapons to the
Iranians had been given to the Contras in their struggled against the
Sandinistas. It was though this revelation that the world was informed of the
greatest scandal since Watergate. The President of the United States had
authorized and knowingly deceived Congress about two major international
operations, both of which were illegal. The Iran-Contra Affair remains a
disgrace in the history of American policy and tarnished the Reagan
presidency. Bibliography Arnson, Cynthia J. 1989. Crossroads: Congress,
The Reagan Administration, and Central America. New York: Random
House. Draper, Theodore. 1991. A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs.
New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux. Walsh, Lawrence E. 1997. Firewall:
The Iran Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company.
Word Count: 1038 The Iran-Contra affair is not one scandalous incident, but rather two covert
operations started under Reagan's administration. In the beginning, these two
operations were independent of each other, but eventually became linked
though funds received from the sale of arms to Iran for hostages and then
given to the Contras fighting to overthrow a Marxist government in
Nicaragua. The scandal began with Nicaraguan politics. After the Marxist
Sandinista regime took over Nicaragua in 1979, the government was faced
with a growing communist threat to US interest in Central America. When
President Reagan took office in 1981, he was vehemently determined to halt
the spread of communism, especially in Central America (Arnson 1989, 8).
Seeking to bolster US prestige and military power, Reagan took a tough
stand against communism in the Western Hemisphere. In Nicaragua, he gave
the Central Intelligence Agency the approval to help organize and aid a group
of Contrarevolucionarios or Contras who were in opposition to the
Sandinista regime (Arnson 1989, 6). Congress, unwilling to fight in another
country's war after the devastating loss in Vietnam, began restricting the use
of government funds for rebel guerrillas in Central America. The CIA,
concerned that soon Congress would cut off the funding for their program,
began to stockpile arms for the contras (Walsh 1997, 18). Their fears were
realized when Congress enacted the second Boland Amendment which
stated: No funds available tot he Central Intelligence Agency, the Department
of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in
intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose of which
would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization,
movement, or individual (Arnson 1989, 167-8). The Reagan administration
interpreted the Boland Amendment as not covering the activities of the
National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was established in 1947 with
the explicit purpose of advising the President on all matters relating to national
security. Beginning with the Eisenhower administration, the NSC was given a
small staff that ultimately grew and turned into a vital arm of the presidency.
As years went by, the NSC staff began controlling the policy-making output
of both State and Defense Department, as well as the activities of the CIA
(Draper 1991, 11). When the CIA was banned from acting in Nicaragua by
the second Boland amendment, President Reagan surreptitiously bypassed
Congress and employed his NSC staff instead. National Security Council
staffer Oliver North became the central coordinator supplying aid to the
Contras. After Reagan's reelection in 1984, he began an additional covert
operation. This time, it was the effort to release seven American hostages
being held in Lebanon by a radical Islamic group called the Hezbollah. The
operation included trading arms for hostages, which clearly violated the Arms
Export Control Act, the National Security Act, and stated US policy not to
deal with terrorists (Walsh 1997, 3). Iran, in the middle of a war with Iraq,
was desperate for weapons. Many Iranians approached US officials offering
t help free the hostages in Lebanon in exchange for arms. National Security
Adviser Robert McFarlane was approached by Israeli intermediaries and
was persuaded to ask the President about negations with the Iranians.
Reagan approved a shipment of 96 wire-guided anti-tank missiles to be
delivered to Iran on August 30, 1985, and another 408 to be delivered on
September 14. After the secret exchange of these weapons, the Iranians
released only one hostage. In an effort to release more hostages, a second
large shipment of weapons was to take place in November. The Israeli
aircraft intended to ship the weapons could not fly directly to Iran. The plan
was to fly to a European air base, transfer the cargo to another plane and
then fly to Iran, but they were not able to obtain the necessary clearance to
do so. From that point on, Oliver North began arranging for CIA planes to
carry the shipment of weapons to Iran (Walsh 1997, 5). The President then
decided to drop the Israelis as middlemen and negotiated the direct sale of
arms from the United Stated to Iran. HE also decided to keep these actions
secret from Congress. North subsequently began selling the Iranians missiles
at marked up prices. He negotiated low purchase price with the Department
of Defense and the surplus funds were then used to pay for aid to the Contras
(Walsh 1997, 20). Two unrelated incidents that revealed Iranian and Contra
covert operations occurred within one month of each other. On October 5,
1986, Sandinista troops shot down an airplane carrying ten thousand pounds
of ammunition and weapons being sent to the Contras who were fighting in
northern Nicaragua. The only surviving crewmember, Eugene Hassenfus, was
captured and confessed his role in an American covert operation to aid the
Contras. He was also found crying the business card of a US official who
was integral to the arms deal (Arnson 1989, 199). The second incident
occurred on November 3, 1986. A Lebanese magazine, Al Shiraa, published
a story that exposed the United States sale of arms to Iran in exchange for
hostages. This story was picked up by the news media not only in the United
States but also throughout the world, as was confirmed by the speaker of the
Iranian parliament (Walsh 1997, 8). The connection to these two events was
confirmed domestically when Edwin Meese, Counselor to the President and
Attorney General, announced that money from the sale of weapons to the
Iranians had been given to the Contras in their struggled against the
Sandinistas. It was though this revelation that the world was informed of the
greatest scandal since Watergate. The President of the United States had
authorized and knowingly deceived Congress about two major international
operations, both of which were illegal. The Iran-Contra Affair remains a
disgrace in the history of American policy and tarnished the Reagan
presidency. Bibliography Arnson, Cynthia J. 1989. Crossroads: Congress,
The Reagan Administration, and Central America. New York: Random
House. Draper, Theodore. 1991. A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs.
New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux. Walsh, Lawrence E. 1997. Firewall:
The Iran Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company.
Word Count: 1038
Bibliography
The Iran-Contra affair is not one scandalous incident, but rather two covert
operations started under Reagan's administration. In the beginning, these two
operations were independent of each other, but eventually became linked
though funds received from the sale of arms to Iran for hostages and then
given to the Contras fighting to overthrow a Marxist government in
Nicaragua. The scandal began with Nicaraguan politics. After the Marxist
Sandinista regime took over Nicaragua in 1979, the government was faced
with a growing communist threat to US interest in Central America. When
President Reagan took office in 1981, he was vehemently determined to halt
the spread of communism, especially in Central America (Arnson 1989, 8).
Seeking to bolster US prestige and military power, Reagan took a tough
stand against communism in the Western Hemisphere. In Nicaragua, he gave
the Central Intelligence Agency the approval to help organize and aid a group
of Contrarevolucionarios or Contras who were in opposition to the
Sandinista regime (Arnson 1989, 6). Congress, unwilling to fight in another
country's war after the devastating loss in Vietnam, began restricting the use
of government funds for rebel guerrillas in Central America. The CIA,
concerned that soon Congress would cut off the funding for their program,
began to stockpile arms for the contras (Walsh 1997, 18). Their fears were
realized when Congress enacted the second Boland Amendment which
stated: No funds available tot he Central Intelligence Agency, the Department
of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in
intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose of which
would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization,
movement, or individual (Arnson 1989, 167-8). The Reagan administration
interpreted the Boland Amendment as not covering the activities of the
National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was established in 1947 with
the explicit purpose of advising the President on all matters relating to national
security. Beginning with the Eisenhower administration, the NSC was given a
small staff that ultimately grew and turned into a vital arm of the presidency.
As years went by, the NSC staff began controlling the policy-making output
of both State and Defense Department, as well as the activities of the CIA
(Draper 1991, 11). When the CIA was banned from acting in Nicaragua by
the second Boland amendment, President Reagan surreptitiously bypassed
Congress and employed his NSC staff instead. National Security Council
staffer Oliver North became the central coordinator supplying aid to the
Contras. After Reagan's reelection in 1984, he began an additional covert
operation. This time, it was the effort to release seven American hostages
being held in Lebanon by a radical Islamic group called the Hezbollah. The
operation included trading arms for hostages, which clearly violated the Arms
Export Control Act, the National Security Act, and stated US policy not to
deal with terrorists (Walsh 1997, 3). Iran, in the middle of a war with Iraq,
was desperate for weapons. Many Iranians approached US officials offering
t help free the hostages in Lebanon in exchange for arms. National Security
Adviser Robert McFarlane was approached by Israeli intermediaries and
was persuaded to ask the President about negations with the Iranians.
Reagan approved a shipment of 96 wire-guided anti-tank missiles to be
delivered to Iran on August 30, 1985, and another 408 to be delivered on
September 14. After the secret exchange of these weapons, the Iranians
released only one hostage. In an effort to release more hostages, a second
large shipment of weapons was to take place in November. The Israeli
aircraft intended to ship the weapons could not fly directly to Iran. The plan
was to fly to a European air base, transfer the cargo to another plane and
then fly to Iran, but they were not able to obtain the necessary clearance to
do so. From that point on, Oliver North began arranging for CIA planes to
carry the shipment of weapons to Iran (Walsh 1997, 5). The President then
decided to drop the Israelis as middlemen and negotiated the direct sale of
arms from the United Stated to Iran. HE also decided to keep these actions
secret from Congress. North subsequently began selling the Iranians missiles
at marked up prices. He negotiated low purchase price with the Department
of Defense and the surplus funds were then used to pay for aid to the Contras
(Walsh 1997, 20). Two unrelated incidents that revealed Iranian and Contra
covert operations occurred within one month of each other. On October 5,
1986, Sandinista troops shot down an airplane carrying ten thousand pounds
of ammunition and weapons being sent to the Contras who were fighting in
northern Nicaragua. The only surviving crewmember, Eugene Hassenfus, was
captured and confessed his role in an American covert operation to aid the
Contras. He was also found crying the business card of a US official who
was integral to the arms deal (Arnson 1989, 199). The second incident
occurred on November 3, 1986. A Lebanese magazine, Al Shiraa, published
a story that exposed the United States sale of arms to Iran in exchange for
hostages. This story was picked up by the news media not only in the United
States but also throughout the world, as was confirmed by the speaker of the
Iranian parliament (Walsh 1997, 8). The connection to these two events was
confirmed domestically when Edwin Meese, Counselor to the President and
Attorney General, announced that money from the sale of weapons to the
Iranians had been given to the Contras in their struggled against the
Sandinistas. It was though this revelation that the world was informed of the
greatest scandal since Watergate. The President of the United States had
authorized and knowingly deceived Congress about two major international
operations, both of which were illegal. The Iran-Contra Affair remains a
disgrace in the history of American policy and tarnished the Reagan
presidency. Bibliography Arnson, Cynthia J. 1989. Crossroads: Congress,
The Reagan Administration, and Central America. New York: Random
House. Draper, Theodore. 1991. A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs.
New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux. Walsh, Lawrence E. 1997. Firewall:
The Iran Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company.
Word Count: 1038
Word Count: 2082
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